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YouTube, Multichannel Networks and the accelerated evolution of the new screen ecology  
 
 
The concept of ‘connected viewing’ encapsulates deep changes in consumer habit and 
expectation relating ‘to a larger trend across the media industries to integrate digital technology 
and socially networked communication with traditional screen media practices’ (Holt & Sanson, 
2013: 1). Connected viewing has given rise not only to major challenges to established screen 
media, but is being shaped by a set of newly prominent online screen entertainment platforms, 
most prominently Apple, Amazon and Netflix, but also Alphabet/Google/YouTube. We have 
previously examined the broad contours of this phenomenon (Cunningham & Silver, 2013). 
Arguably one of the most challenging and innovative elements of the evolving screen ecology is 
a very low-budget tier of mostly advertising-supported online channels driven mainly by the 
professionalisation and monetisation of previously amateur content creation.  
 
Previously amateur creators use platforms such as YouTube (but also others such as Vine, 
Instagram, Snapchat, Vimeo, Vessel and increasingly cross- and multi-platform strategies) to 
develop subscriber/fan bases of significant size and often transnational composition, often 
generating as a consequence significant advertising and sponsorship revenue and increasingly the 
attention of mainstream media. Core to the ecology are the rapidly evolving business strategies 
of the major platforms (especially YouTube), as they seek to disrupt traditional media 
incumbents, avoid crippling battles over intellectual property and piracy, optimise their own 
income streams while devolving sufficient revenue to creators to continue to build massive scale 
and maintain creator loyalty in the face of criticism of their business practices and power, while 
clearly dealing with a class of content creators who may be able to exercise a higher level of 
control over their career trajectories than previous models of professionalising talent.  
 
This article focuses on the ‘accelerated evolution’ of core components of this part of the 
connected viewing ecology: YouTube itself, and the so-called Multichannel Networks (MCNs). 
An MCN is a Google/YouTube-approved intermediary aggregating, affiliated with, and/or 
managing YouTube channels by ‘offering their assistance in diverse areas, ranging from 
production to monetisation, in exchange for a percentage of the ad revenue’ (VAST Media White 
Paper).  As a new class of intermediaries, having grown rapidly since the explosion in numbers 
of previously amateur creators, they seek to stabilise runaway growth and respond to ‘glocal’ 
dynamics, while also justifying their additional stake in the revenue stream by providing a creole 
mix of talent agency, big data analytics, public relations and marketing. Estimated to number 
well above 100, MCNs have been formed in almost every country in which there are YouTube 
creators. The most prominent and largest include Fullscreen, Vevo, Machinima, Maker Studios, 
StyleHaul, Awesomeness TV, Collective Digital Studios (based in the US), Rightstar (and 
Base79) (UK), Studio71/ProSieben (Germany), Studio Bagel/Canal Plus (France), QuizGroup 
(Russia), and numerous others, including, at last count, 18 in India.  
 
It would be little overstatement to claim that these overall dynamics of the new screen ecology 
are a huge, unprecedented experiment in seeking to convert vernacular or informal creativity into 
talent and content increasingly attractive to advertisers, brands, talent agencies, studios and 
venture capital investors on a near-global scale – with implications for content/entertainment 
formats, production cultures, industry structures and measurement of audience engagement: 
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‘[T]he world has never before seen the likes of YouTube in terms of availability of non-
infringing content’ (Hetcher, 2013: 45). 
 
A major focus of recent media, communication and cultural studies scholarship has focused on 
such ‘vernacular creativity’ (Burgess, 2006), ‘produsage’ (Bruns, 2008), the ‘informal’ sector 
(Lobato and Thomas, 2015), ‘amateur media’ (Hunter et al, 2013), and ‘participatory culture’ 
(Jenkins et al, 2009) or ‘spreadable media’ (Jenkins, Ford and Green, 2013). Where this debate 
has turned to YouTube’s ‘formalisation’ (which references, in Lobato and Thomas’ (2015) 
framework, the movement from amateur video into monetisation and the market), of which the 
MCNs have been a critical part, it has tended to center on the loss of the communitarian, 
originating amateur spirit of the early days of the platform.  In the first critical monograph on 
YouTube, Jean Burgess and Joshua Green spoke of its meaning and uses being 
‘underdetermined’ in its early days: ‘YouTube’s ascendancy has occurred amid a fog of 
uncertainty and contradiction around what it is actually for. YouTube’s apparent or stated 
mission has continuously morphed as a result of both corporate practices and audience use’ 
(Burgess and Green, 2009: 3). But other scholars have been unequivocal about YouTube 
seemingly poised to become yet another cog in the media content industry. Kim (2012) describes 
this shift as the ‘institutionalization of YouTube from user-generated to professional-generated 
content’.  Similarly, Van Dijck (2013) describes YouTube’s evolution from homecasting to 
broadcasting and ‘toward viewer-based principles and away from community-oriented social 
networking’ (117).  In the wake of these changes, according to Van Dijck, ‘[a] far cry from its 
original design, YouTube is no longer an alternative to television, but a full-fledged player in the 
media entertainment industry’ (127).  
 
Notwithstanding, there is still massive civic space available on YouTube, given the range and 
continued hyperbolic growth of YouTube content and no known platform-initiated inhibition for 
such content. But the accelerated rate of change, in particular its professionalising-amateur 
commercialisation strategies, have now reached a level that demands critical analytical attention 
without such strategies being normatively framed against the brief period of pure YouTube 
amateurism and informality.  
 
YouTube between ‘NoCal’ and ‘SoCal’ 
 
Our earlier framing of the new screen ecology (Cunningham & Silver, 2013) emphasized the 
evidence that firms that have long dominated the mass media may now face the most serious 
challenge in their history. Hollywood tried and, with the partial exception of Hulu, failed to 
establish viable online distribution businesses since the first attempts dating from 1997.  Those 
which have instead succeeded are outsiders, most of which are much larger companies with far 
larger resources employing IT industry business models rather than Hollywood’s premium-
content and -pricing models. We employ the distinction between ‘NoCal’ (or NorCal) and 
‘SoCal’, drawing from the ‘notorious rivalry’1 in popular culture between Northern and Southern 
California as evinced in regional accent and degrees of (liberal) politics. But our focus is on the 
fact that this rivalry around cultural geography also maps remarkably to two very distinct, world-
leading industrial cultures which are increasingly clashing and converging. The effects of such a 
clash of the Titans will largely determine the shape of ‘connected viewing’ for years to come. 
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The fundamental difference between Google/YouTube, Apple’s iTunes, Netflix, Amazon, 
Yahoo!, Facebook (‘NoCal’) and Hollywood’s incumbents (‘SoCal’) – one which optimizes their 
chances of being able to formulate successful business models and better monetize screen 
content online – is that they have built the underlying platforms and affordances that largely 
enable ‘connected viewing’. They are Internet ‘pure-play’ companies that already had or have 
been able to develop a critical mass of online customers and possess extensive data on their past 
online search behavior and purchasing habits. In addition, they have years of experience 
marketing directly to their customer base targeting those most likely to be interested in a 
particular genre or program based on web analytics of each individual’s past behavior and any 
product feedback that they may have provided. The fact they have been prepared to work around 
content blocking tactics of the Majors by commissioning new content has led to substantial 
change in the modes of presentation and distribution of content. 
 
However, the closer the ecology is examined, the more it is apparent that it is better understood 
as an interdependent clash of cultures. Much of what is driving the corporate restructurings, 
readjustments, acquisitions and new businesses in this space – including the emergence of the 
MCNs – is the creative destruction wreaked by what we have called the ‘IT-innovation’ model 
on screen incumbents (Cunningham & Silver, 2013: 5). But just as significantly, the IT 
behemoths are having to come to terms with both the old and the new fundamentals of mass 
media entertainment. This includes the messy idiosyncrasies of taste on the consumer side that 
has given rise to established media’s ways of dealing with the radical uncertainty of demand (in 
economist Richard Caves words, ‘it is not quite – but almost – appropriate to say that innovation 
in creative activities need involve nothing more than consumers changing their minds about what 
they like’ (2002: 202)). It also includes the wary conservatism about the digital harboured by 
brands and advertisers – which are the source of virtually all funding; as well as the new power 
and agency of content producers. On the one hand, the screen ecology is getting used to being in 
a state of what the software industry refers to as ‘permanent beta’ – a state of rapid prototyping, 
or ‘fail fast, learn, pivot’. On the other hand, Google’s engineering culture has to come to terms 
with branded content as the driver of the next stage of advertising revenue. This is the challenge 
of ‘monetisation after [Google’s] AdSense’, in the words of digital executive Jordan Levin 
(2015) – marketing and advertising that cannot be massively scaled-up through automation (or 
programmatics, as it is called in the industry). 
 
The less-than-ten year history of YouTube since Google’s takeover can be written as a history of 
Google seeking to come to terms with the SoCal fundamentals of entertainment, and content and 
talent development, from its NoCal base as an IT company dedicated to scale, automation, 
permanent beta, rapid prototyping and iteration.  These efforts reflect both continuities and 
contestations with traditional media models, particularly business models. The results, especially 
for creators and MCNs, have been decidedly mixed. 
 
YouTube’s monetization strategies have exposed the faltering co-dependency between media 
and advertising, reflecting the inefficiencies of traditional media advertising while highlighting 
the affordances and targeted efficacy of online analytics.  In marked contrast to traditional film 
studios and television networks, YouTube elected to avoid the messy and legally cumbersome 
traditional media model of owned or shared IP.  YouTube also avoided paying fees for content as 
well as offering backend residual or profit participation.  Rather, YouTube entered into 
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‘partnership agreements’ with their content creators based on a split of advertising revenue from 
first dollar.  This strategy has proven effective.  In the eight years since the partner plan 
launched, YouTube has secured over one million YouTube partners worldwide.   
 
Following established practice in broadcast media, Google adopted the traditional advertising 
algorithm based on cost per thousand views (CPMs); however, Google was able to introduce 
targeted advertising based on the wealth of data provided by Google Analytics.  Building on this 
NoCal twist, in 2007, Google introduced their AdSense technology to the YouTube platform, 
which allowed content creators to feature advertising on their YouTube pages, including semi-
transparent banner ads overlaid on top of the videos.  In 2008, Google’s purchase of DoubleClick 
introduced programmatic (automated) ad buying to YouTube’s platform.  Combined, these 
technologies helped YouTube achieve virtually frictionless commerce on their platform on a 
scale previously unimaginable. In the wake of these initiatives, YouTube finally turned a profit 
in 2014 and is expected to top $9 billion globally in 2015 (Hough, 2015).  Although only 10% of 
Google’s total revenue – estimated at $86 billion (Somaney, 2016) – as YouTube viewing keeps 
rising and ad dollars continue to shift to digital, these numbers are predicted to rise significantly.  
YouTube has become a viable competitor to traditional television advertising, hoping to lure up 
to 24% of television’s advertising revenue to the platform (O’Reilly, 2015).    
 
Rather than suffer the fate of Napster, YouTube aggressively moved to mitigate the risk of 
litigation from the major rights holders, seeking rapprochement with traditional SoCal media 
rather than threatening it.  In 2006, YouTube launched the revolutionary Content ID system that 
identifies professionally-produced content and automatically flags potential copyright 
infringement.  YouTube provides the option for the rights-holder to either have the video 
removed or collect all the advertising revenue on the video.  In addition, YouTube entered 
directly into negotiations with traditional media networks to create channels for their content.  As 
a result of this strategy, YouTube managed to avoid most litigation with the major players, 
except for Viacom who would eventually settle their suite against YouTube for copyright 
infringement in 2014. 
 
In addition, YouTube pursued new strategies to professionalize and program amateur, user-
generated, vernacular content to secure greater advertising revenue. In 2011, YouTube bought 
Next New Networks, a web television company that programmed multiple video channels 
featuring higher quality videos produced by original content providers.  Shortly thereafter, 
YouTube launched their first of two Original Channel initiatives.  These channels featured an 
eclectic mix of media brands and celebrities, including Madonna, Shaquille O’Neal, and the Wall 
Street Journal.  A year later, YouTube offered another $200 Million for a new set of 100 
channels, which were a mix of the new and older channels. 
 
In short order, YouTube had gone from a safe harbour for pirated Hollywood content to 
partnering with Hollywood media companies and professionalizing their own talent. Through 
their channel initiatives, YouTube seemed to be emulating television, both in terms of the search 
for premium content and its co-dependence upon advertising revenue.  As we have seen, for 
many industry pundits and academic scholars, YouTube seemed poised to become yet another 
media content industry. José van Dijck was clear: ‘the distinctiveness of YouTube as an 
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alternative to television was no longer defensible, particularly when we look at the site’s content’ 
(2013: 118).  
 
However, the SoCal makeover was decidedly incomplete, and has in many ways been 
abandoned. There remain stark differences in structural, organizational, and material interests 
between traditional and online media, not least of which is the lack of distribution scarcity online 
leading to an abundance of content and low barriers of entry for content creators.  The sheer, 
unprecedented scale of the ramp up of both content creators generating substantial subscriber/fan 
bases, and the engagement with advertisers to generate the revenue, has resulted in an 
overwhelming emphasis on volume, which is now coming into crisis.  
 
This crisis is highlighted by the collapse of YouTube CPMs, even as the overall online 
advertising revenue has continued to grow.  The ‘programmatic’ advertising model is an 
‘extremely limited economic model’, according to one of the most successful online 
entrepreneurs, Hank Green (2014), becoming less and less viable as a sustaining revenue base for 
both creatives and intermediaries like MCNs.  The content inventory has grown exponentially; as 
mentioned, there over a million YouTube Partners and 1500 channels with subscribers 
numbering one million or more. Partners are signed up to share AdSense revenue. AdSense 
income cannot in any way keep pace with the exponential growth of content seeking advertising 
support. Thus, according to Andrew Baron of Tubefilter, ‘YouTube has literally DESTROYED – 
with a capital DESTROYED – the video ad market.  What started out as a standard and relatively 
reasonable benchmark of $25CPM for both broadcast sales and online video sales just a few 
years ago, is down now to around a $2 take home this year’ (Winkler, 2015).  
  
In addition, YouTube’s experiment in attracting premium content from traditional media has 
been thwarted by the rise of transactional, subscription, or even advertiser-based platforms 
offering more lucrative deals, e.g. iTunes, Amazon, Netflix, and Hulu.  Premium and basic cable 
as well as broadcast networks are launching their own OTT platforms, including HBO, which 
allow subscribers to watch content on mobile or online, with or without cable or satellite 
packages.  In addition, sports franchises and leagues, e.g. Major League Baseball (MLB), have 
also launched their own video platforms and hired senior television/digital media executives to 
create original content.  Digital content doyen and former head of the WBTV and Alloy Digital, 
Jordan Levin, has recently become head of content creation for the National Football League 
(NFL).  
 
Meanwhile, a series of new online video platforms have emerged to begin to threaten YouTube’s 
incumbency, including SnapChat, Periscope, Vine, Instagram, and Victorious.  All of these 
platforms offer revenue-sharing, although they differ in terms of the content and formats.  For 
example, Vine offers only 6 second videos, SnapChat offers short form videos that disappear 
within 24 hours, and Periscope offers live broadcasting.  Facebook represents the greatest threat 
to YouTube’s incumbency due to its comparable scale to YouTube.  Over the first few months of 
2015, Facebook launched their own proprietary video player and introduced a partnership 
program for their own content creators. In terms of monetization, according to Bakersense, 
Facebook has in 2015 eclipsed YouTube as the premiere video platform for branded content 
(James, 2015).    
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‘NoCal’ tech culture is comfortable with, and expects to, regularly ‘reboot’ (start again), ‘iterate’ 
(try again), or ‘pivot’ (change direction). Over the past few years, YouTube has repeatedly 
changed their partnership plan.  Revenue splits have shifted from a high of 70/30 in favour of 
their premium creators to a standardized split of 55/45.   In addition, in order to improve their 
analytics for advertisers, YouTube routinely changes their algorithms, which has resulted in the 
mysterious – mysterious, that is, to creators who depend on the constant connectedness to their 
viewers - disappearance of millions of subscribers overnight for some creators. These shifts in 
agreements and analytics have contributed to creator-partner disgruntlement, driving a great 
many creators to alternative platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Vine.  In response, 
YouTube has begun to fund film and television ventures under the banner of YouTube Originals 
featuring their top content creators, e.g., PewDiePie, Smosh, Fine Brothers, RoosterTeech, Lilly 
Singh, and Joey Graceffa.  These ‘SoCal’ initiatives have helped YouTube thwart defections to 
other platforms. 
 
YouTube’s latest pivots would appear to be less visionary or strategic and more reactive in 
response to new competitor platforms, organizations, and services. YouTube cancelled their 
channel initiatives and launched their own in-house ad agency, The Zoo, designed to deal 
directly with advertisers and YouTube creators. In a major move that apes ‘mainstream’ 
platforms for professional entertainment content such as Netflix, YouTube Red, an ad-free 
subscription service claiming to enable access to 95% of existing platform content, was launched 
in late 2015. Red is designed to thwart the new windowing strategies offered by platforms like 
Vessel and Vimeo, and to generate a much-needed additional revenue stream.  
 
YouTube’s ability to iterate rapidly reflects their NoCal ethos of ‘pivot or die’, although their 
latest moves still borrow from SoCal business models. YouTube Red is less like a premium cable 
model, more like windowing, a traditional media licensing practice, in this instance offering 
subscribers a ‘sneak peek’ without advertising.  After an unspecified amount of time, the content 
will be made available on their original platform with advertising.  In addition, the service also 
offers Google Music, a bundling-play comparable to cable television packages.  Furthermore, as 
described in the next section, YouTube has entered into direct competition to MCNs, the very 
organizations that YouTube helped fund and create. 
 
MCNs in the vortex of the convergent innovation space between NoCal and SoCal  
 
After almost a decade of accelerated evolution, YouTube’s platform has helped launch the 
potential and realised careers of hundreds of thousands of content creators, some of whom are 
building their brands across multiple platforms both on and offline.  Core to assisting YouTube 
to come to terms with SoCal media culture was its facilitation of MCNs, most of which were 
formed in the wake of YouTube’s partnership program and channel initiatives.  MCNs have 
helped YouTube manage, monetize, and professionalize amateur content creation when its 
explosive growth could not be managed by YouTube alone.   
 
The term ‘MCN’ is arguably a misnomer, a term that broadly and reductively describes an array 
of media organizations.  All aggregate channels, but the strategy differs: horizontal aggregators 
are scale-driven (Fullscreen, QuizGroup); vertical aggregators target niche markets with strong 
community bases (Machinima, Tastemade, StyleHaul, DanceOn); some employ talent 
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development agency strategies (Awesomeness TV, Big Frame, Maker Studios); while others 
seek to lead in technology (Zefr, Broadband TV). MCNs feature diverse histories, some of which 
(Machinima, Maker) well predate YouTube’s channel initiatives.  These organizations are 
comprised of both traditional and digital media managers, whether described as executives, 
producers, agents, social media marketers, or even, in the case of analytics company 
Zefr,‘fanthropologists’.  In addition, these MCNs feature multiple, diverse, and evolving value 
propositions including: networks of digital creators producing content across multiple channels 
and platforms; digital studios and production companies designed to professionalize amateur 
content creators; and digital talent agents and managers helping to monetize amateur content 
creators across traditional and digital platforms. 
 
In the context of media production cultures studies (e.g. Caldwell, 2008; Mayer, Banks, and 
Caldwell, 2010) and debates about the precarious status of creative labour (amongst a large 
literature, see Banks and Hesmondhalgh, 2009; Banks, 2007 and, for an evaluation, 
Cunningham, 2014), these organizations need to be examined as contemporary instances of 
precarious creative media management. Media management scholarship has described an array 
of media organizations and professionals, whether independent film and television production 
companies, production and programming executives operating within film studios and television 
networks, or talent and management agencies and representatives, but it has rarely been posited 
as precarious as has so much below the line media work.  Some scholars characterize media 
managers as ‘hidden talent’ (Kemper 2009) or ‘invisible labor’ (Roussel 2015), operating within 
a liminal position between media owners and creative labor, yet exercising considerable power 
and influence.  Albarran (2010) and Küng-Shankelman (2008) have challenged the normative 
assumptions about media management, as distinct from other forms of business management, 
particularly when fostering collaboration, creativity, and innovation. In addition, the value and 
practices of talent and literary agents and managers have been overlooked by all but a handful of 
scholars including Kemper (2009), Roussel and Bielby (2015), and Zafirau (2007).  Havens and 
Lotz (2011) have developed this discourse further, considering how managers have 
‘circumscribed agency’ within the structure of media organizations.  Production scholars 
(represented in e.g. Mayer, Banks, and Caldwell 2010) have only recently identified how 
television production executives have operated at the intersection of creative labor and brand 
management.   
 
Johnson, Kompare, and Santo (2014) have proposed that ‘management should be framed not 
merely as a work category responsible for overseeing labor, but as a kind of labor – and a way of 
creating meanings and values from labor – that takes diverse forms within the media industries’ 
(19).  Lotz (2014) recognizes the presence and value media managers occupy across multiple 
industries, featuring a dizzying and opaque array of titles and operating with variable forms of 
agency.  Havens (2014) refers to these media professionals as media intermediaries ‘operating as 
prime focalizing sites for the transaction between industrial and representational practices’ (39).  
 
While scholarship on media management has been thus articulated, it has yet to be applied to 
MCNs and their management cultures (but see Mann, 2015).  In this section, we stress their 
increasingly precarious nature, in contrast to traditional media management operating in the 
relatively more settled Hollywood media system, as well, for that matter, as inside 
Google/YouTube.  This precariousness arises from the MCNs being creations of the volatile 
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conditions within the new screen ecology; its accelerated evolution bears directly on their 
sustainability.  
  
MCNs’ placement in the middle of the convergent innovation space between NoCal and SoCal 
sees them being ‘squeezed’ from above and below. ‘Above’ – more powerful than – them in the 
ecology is Google/YouTube, which, having invited in, nurtured and licensed MCNs, is now 
encroaching on their basic business model by developing its own branded content R&D through 
direct engagement with top brands in its in-house agency The Zoo. ‘Below’ them, successful, 
MCN-mentored, YouTubers are poached by mainstream talent agencies, move to the numerous 
other platforms on offer, and/or negotiate much better terms of trade for themselves. To remain 
viable, MCNs are needing to innovate even more rapidly than YouTube and the other digital 
platforms, and certainly faster than established media, and with both NoCal and SoCal strategies.    
 
On the NoCal side, these organizations have morphed beyond channel aggregators on YouTube 
to become Multi-platform Networks (MPNs).  Borrowing from their own client’s creative 
practices, MPNs foster a rhizomatic content creation and distribution strategy that neither NoCal 
platforms or SoCal networks can easily emulate.  This strategy goes beyond cultivating 
‘spreadable media’ that can flow across platforms (Jenkins et al, 2013); rather content has to be 
reconfigured to appear natively on each platform according to their affordances (e.g., 15 second 
videos on Instagram, 6 second looping videos on Vine, etc.).  Whether the content is monetized 
or simply promotional, these posts all provide added value to creators incubated, nurtured, and 
professionalized by the MPNs.  In addition, these MPNs provide either proprietary cross-
platform analytics or rely on a raft of new third party data companies (e.g. Zefr, Social Blade, 
and Tubular Labs) that generate more comprehensive analytics than any single platform can.  
Multi-platforming represents an altogether unique strategy from either NoCal distribution or 
SoCal content, and arguably represents another evolution in connected viewing. 
 
On the SoCal side, they are managing a quite different class of entry- to mid-level talent to that 
managed typically by talent agencies. Online creators, by definition, bring successful audience 
development, and clear ideas about the roots of their success, with them. MCNs are under 
pressure to prove their value to successful creators. On both sides, the MCNs face Clayton 
Christensen’s (2000) ‘innovator’s dilemma’ – the dangers of first-in-line innovators.    
 
This select history of MCNs highlights these dynamics. As previously mentioned, Next New 
Networks (NNN) was purchased by YouTube in 2011 and helped inspire the Original Channel 
initiatives and the funding of MCNs.  However, NNN was actually launched years earlier in 
2007 and run by a mix of veteran traditional and digital media executives.  Furthermore, prior to 
its purchase by YouTube, NNN had been a multi-platform content company, having entered into 
partnership agreements with both AOL and MySpace.  Since their acquisition, NNN became an 
incubator lab for YouTube’s channels and partners and no longer existed as a standalone 
organization.  As for their hybrid traditional-digital management team, one of NNN’s partners, 
Herb Scannell, had been a Senior Nickelodeon executive and now runs BBC Worldwide 
productions.  NNN partner Timothy Shey had worked within the emerging digital divisions of 
traditional media before helping to launch NNN and now runs YouTube’s scripted programming 
division.  As a prototype MCN, what happened to NNN is indicative of precariousness: YouTube 
not only acquired NNN, but subsequently closed down its operations, borrowed its business 
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model for aggregating creators and programming channels, and then disbanded or subsumed 
their management.   
 
In the case of Machinima, the business case impelled by YouTube’s investment bore little 
resemblance to its original identity.  Launched in 2000, machinima.com became the hub for a 
highly innovative format that remixed videogame elements to create scripted entertainment.  
Relaunched in 2007 as a media company, Machinima became a YouTube-based site and, by 
2011, became one of the earliest channels funded by YouTube.  In a major NoCal makeover, 
Machinima morphed into one of the largest MCNs, operating as a mass aggregator of gameplay 
and fanboy channels of far less quality and distinction than their original format-specific site. 
Despite the massive scale of Machinima’s audience, the ongoing tensions between the earlier 
aspiration as a production studio and a mass aggregator of – at least from the point of view of 
advertisers – problematic content have inhibited growth of the company beyond AdSense 
revenue, thwarted its potential buyout except for modest investment by Warners, and contributed 
to massive management upheaval.   
 
Although originally launched as talent management agencies, in the wake of YouTube’s channel 
initiatives, Collective Digital Studios and Big Frame incorporated production and programming 
operations.  Founded in 2005, The Collective had been a traditional talent agency servicing 
traditional film, television, and music talent before representing emerging digital talent (e.g. Fred 
Fugglestone, a pseudonym for a character created by online content creator Lucas Cruikshank).  
However, YouTube’s channel initiative required The Collective agency to launch Collective 
Digital Studios, providing production facilities for successful YouTube content creators.  Later, 
CDS returned to its primary function as a talent management firm featuring digital content 
creators operating across multi-platforms, aware, as most MCNs have become, that being tied 
exclusively to one platform is unsustainable.  In July 2015, the German media company, 
ProSieben, invested $85M to acquire a controlling interest in the company.   
 
Like CDS, Big Frame was initially a talent agency, managing the careers of early digital content 
creators like Philip DeFranco, although the founders, Sarah Penna and Steve Raymond, were 
former television executives, not talent agents.  Like CDS, YouTube’s channel initiatives 
impelled Big Frame to become an MCN with programmed channels featuring a suite of 
‘verticals’.  (A vertical is a single themed set of channels (like a TV genre or format), with a 
focus on particular market segments which are at the same time potentially cohesive online 
communities.) These channels catered to women content creators (Wonderly), fashion-lifestyle 
(Polished), LGBT (Outlandish), and urban (Forefront).  However, Big Frame was acquired by a 
larger MCN, AwesomenessTV, in 2011, which assumed management of these programming 
channels. Meanwhile, Big Frame returned to being a digital talent management firm, 
representing talent operating across multi-platforms, including content creators working for other 
MCNs.  
 
But talent management – a core SoCal business activity – is radically different for MCNs. The 
head of the digital division of a leading Hollywood talent agency commented: 
A traditional film or television artist – a writer, a director, a performer – has spent a 
certain amount of their life preparing to be ready for when opportunity knocks. … The 
mentality of a digital creator is the exact opposite. They’re not preparing for an 
 10 
opportunity; they’re creating it themselves. Everyone loves to knock this generation for 
being lazy and entitled and [say] they think that everything should just come to them 
[…] these digital stars are more proactive and more aggressive about taking their 
careers into their own hands than any generation we’ve ever seen before in the video 
business. (Weinstein, 2015)
2
 
Exemplifying claims of ‘connected viewing’ capturing radical changes to the screen ecology, 
this new class of talent comes into contact with management only when they are well beyond the 
basic threshold of commanding a popular base of dedicated subscribers. A low end YouTube 
partner starts from 10,000 subscribers; mid-range runs from there through to around a million; 
high end creators (who are often the most prominent ‘influencers’) range all the way to 
PewdiePie’s 35 million followers. There are more than one million YouTube partners receiving 
some level of remuneration from their uploaded content. 1500 YouTube channels have at least a 
million subscribers. 
 
The typical YouTube creator has had no or little specific training, few qualifications, but comes 
into the orbit of the MCN with at least some degree of success already established and seemingly 
abundant clarity about their relationship with their ‘fan base’. As a consequence, these young, 
underdeveloped, but empowered creators have the ability to come and go from the embrace of 
MCNs. While MCNs contract for exclusivity, as talent grows in power and agency, the MCNs 
lose the ability to sustain these relationships.  As a result, talent flight is common, whether a 
consequence of poor management, competition from other MCNs, or youthful whimsy.  Most 
notably, disgruntled talent, like Ray William Johnson (2012), have publicly voiced their 
concerns over ‘exploitative’ MCNs. 
 
MCNs also compete with each other, innovating with both NoCal and SoCal strategies. Under 
pressure of this competition, MCNs offer a diverse and ever-increasing suite of services, 
including advertising, production, audience, talent, and brand management.  MCNs are primarily 
involved in boosting advertising revenue, through both programmatic multiplatform ad sales, on 
the one hand, and brand integrations, on the other.  For programmatic ad sales, numerous MCNs, 
like Maker and Fullscreen, have launched proprietary software that claim to provide superior 
analytics and royalty reporting.  In addition, a number of data/tech companies have emerged, like 
Tubular Labs, ZEFR and Social Edge, that offer their own proprietary technology to MCNs and 
creators as well as to brands.   These services not only provide more meaningful data than 
YouTube’s own analytic service, but they operate across multiple platforms.   
 
In addition, MCNs help facilitate and manage advertising integrations, a non-programmatic set 
of practices that align brands with influencers.  These services are non-scalable and labor 
intensive.  This practice represents more than traditional media product placement or even 
sponsored media that harkens back to early 1950s television; rather, the brands are featured 
organically within the representational and narrative strategies of the content creator.  Brand 
integration is precarious. In our interviews, we heard accounts of content creators walking away 
from six figure offers out of belief that the brand was not aligned with their content; to go 
forward with a brand that contradicts their lifestyle would be a breach of trust and authenticity 
between creator and community.  While the communal values appear to trump commercial 
value, creators understand that sustaining their relationship with their fans represents the only 
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long term sustainable value.  As Big Frame talent manager, Byron Austen Ashley (2015), 
confirmed, ‘At 19, a million dollars is great. It’s not great if it’s the last check you’ll ever cash’.  
 
Only a handful of MCNs offer production and studio services, e.g. access to better equipment, 
production resources, and sophisticated editing practices.  In part, this reflects the low barriers of 
entry for production and the low quality of the content demanded by their community.  That said, 
they may offer their clients online tutorials for production, editing, and social media engagement.  
Meanwhile, content creators continue to develop their skills on the job, acquiring best practices 
from other creators.  However, one of the unique propositions that MCNs provide is 
collaborations with other content creators.  These ‘collabs’ help introduce new content creators 
and/or aggregate fan communities for both creators.  This further reflects NoCal, ideal social 
media, values, as distinct from the more competitive world of traditional media.  
 
SoCal-style talent management services intent on moving clients from the farm to the big league 
is fraught with complication and viable for only a small subset of content creators.  Traditional 
media has less value for these on-screen performers, who have never cultivated the core 
Hollywood skills of acting, screenwriting, or directing.  Only a small percentage of content 
creators recognize the value in working in Hollywood, whether for lack of adequate 
remuneration, control, or time.  For the more successful content creators, some of whom are 
earning six or seven figure sums from multiple revenue streams, traditional film and television 
fees can be uncompetitive.  Other content creators are less willing to give up the virtually 
absolute control they have over their own work.  Meanwhile, the time required to write or 
perform in traditional media, including protracted periods of development or simply waiting 
around on set for the lighting to change, can cost the creators valuable time spent creating their 
own proprietary content and fostering further engagement with their fans.    
 
MCNs are helping their talent pursue a mix of sales, distribution, and windowing strategies.  
Sales and distribution may include repackaging content to be premiered on other platforms, e.g., 
AwesomenessTV on Nickelodeon, or to international platforms and television, even where 
YouTube is available.  Windowing strategies mean offering SVOD platforms, e.g Vessel and 
Vimeo, first look or additional content.  As an index of the pressure faced by MCNs, they are 
also aggressively pursuing other ancillary revenue streams, not least of which is the highly 
profitable fan conference business.  Hank and John Green launched VidCon, a fan event, creator 
workshop, and industrial trade show.  At 2014’s Vidcon, 18,000 fans met their favourite creators 
in an event routinely described as ‘something like Beatlemania’ (Levine, 2014).  Of note, this 
year’s sixth Vidcon will expand beyond YouTube to other platform for the first time, including 
guest speakers from Vessel and Twitter.   
 
In addition to the events such as Vidcon, the live touring business is booming, featuring content 
creators from multiple platforms.   A short list includes the VansWarped Tour, Amity Fest, 
Digitour, the OMG music tour.  In 2014, Fullscreen launched InTour as ‘a vehicle for 
our Fullscreen talent to be with fans, experiment and create’, according to Fullscreen SVP, Larry 
Shapiro (Bloom, 2014).  Similarly, AwesomenessTV has their own live tour business, which 
includes the Fifth Harmony tour, now in its fifth year.  
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MCNs may also assist creators with developing a line of consumer products or merchandise 
lines, like the Fullscreen Shop or Maker Shop or the Awesomeness TV’s retail store in Los 
Angeles.  Numerous YouTubers have secured book deals, particularly with Razorbill, an imprint 
that is a division of Penguin and Random House.  A number of these have landed at or near the 
top of bestseller lists, leading the Los Angeles Times to inquire ‘Can YouTube stars save 
publishing?’ (Kellogg, 2015). In addition to their tour business, AwesomenessTV has been most 
aggressive in pursuing their owned and operated ancillary revenue, launching a retail store, 
young adult publishing line, and music record label. While all this ‘ancillaries’ development 
looks like standard SoCal strategy, very little of it has occurred through traditional media 
infrastructure. 
 
As YouTube regularly ‘pivots’ its platform, partner, and channel strategies, MCNs have been 
forced to pursue alternative strategies for sustainability.  Most notably, as noted initially in this 
section, many leading MCNs have transformed into multiplatform networks, pursuing revenue 
and engaging in marketing, content, distribution, and audience strategies across an ever-
increasing number of online video and social media platforms and offering creators platform 
integration strategies and analytics superior to YouTube’s.  For some, this strategy is simply a 
reflection of their talent-centric management model, following their clients wherever they 
migrate.  For others, this strategy helps thwart an untoward dependency on YouTube.  As 
Amanda Taylor, CEO of DanceOn noted: 
I think that if you were to launch a company strictly saying, ‘We’re just going to 
aggregate a bunch of channels and that’s going to be our business model on YouTube,’ 
you’re vulnerable. … YouTube has way too much power over you. When people say, 
‘MCNs don’t work,’ that’s what they’re thinking, but really, with any of these 
companies, I think that you either have to be multiplatform or combine with a media 
giant to survive in some ways, but also to flourish. Every powerful media company is a 
combination of a variety of different companies. (Taylor, 2015) 
 
Some MCNs represent more than a media company; rather, a more apt description might be a 
lifestyle brand, much as MTV emerged to represent more than a music channel.  Taylor 
described how dance represents a community that appeals to multiple values and interests, well 
beyond choreographers, dancers, and their fans. DanceOn’s community engages with certain 
forms of art and music, healthy living and diet, and forms of fashion and style.  Access to this 
community allows these MCNs to pursue not only broader audiences and revenue streams but 
also larger and more diverse advertisers.  In referring to her pitch to advertisers, Taylor noted, 
‘This is a category where there are [dance] stars, and oh, by the way, have you thought about 
how positive this category is, and how brand-safe it is?’ It’s aspirational, inspirational, physically 
active’ (2015).      
 
Acquisition is considered an increasingly safe harbor for MCNs exposed at the vortex of the 
accelerated evolution of the new screen ecology. These multiple, iterative strategies by MCNs-
turned-MPNs has resulted in over $1.4B in acquisitions or investments by traditional media.  In 
October 2013, Dreamworks Animation launched what has become a proverbial land grab by 
traditional media for MCNs.  They spent $33million to buy and merge AwesomenessTV and Big 
Frame; a year later, Hearst paid $81 million for a 25 percent stake in the company, now valued at 
$325 million.  Dreamworks Animation’s acquisition was followed by other traditional media 
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players’ moves to acquire, partner, or invest in MCNs.  Most notably, Disney acquired Maker 
Studios for a staggering $500 million (with an additional $450 million on offer against 
performance targets).  In addition, in moves up to late 2014, Fullscreen was acquired by Otter 
Media, a joint partnership between The Chernin Group and AT&T, for between $200 and $300 
million.  European media group, RTL, purchased beauty vertical Stylehaul for $150 million and 
invested in Canadian-based Broadband TV, which allowed them to launch RTL’s Digital Hub.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In attempting to break with a ‘fall from grace’ narrative that may structure analysis of the rapid 
professionalization and monetisation of previously amateur online video content on the main 
global platform, YouTube, this article has constructed histories of key institutions in the new 
screen ecology as outcomes of the increased interpenetration of very different, often clashing 
industry cultures. Google/YouTube, Apple’s iTunes, Netflix, Amazon, Yahoo!, Facebook 
(‘NoCal’) are largely Internet “pure-play” companies, while Hollywood’s incumbents (‘SoCal’) 
practice time-honoured mass media and premium content strategies. The ‘history of the present’ 
of the new screen ecology is the history of the clash of these cultures. 
 
The less-than-ten year history of Google’s YouTube can be written as a history of Google 
seeking to come to terms with the conditions of possibility for entertainment, content and talent 
development from its base as an IT company dedicated to scale, automation, permanent beta, 
rapid prototyping and iteration.  These efforts reflect both continuities and contestations with 
traditional media models, particularly business models. As emerging intermediaries in the middle 
of the convergent space between NoCal and SoCal, MCNs’ placement sees them needing to 
innovate on both the NoCal and SoCal side. On the former side, MCNs are attempting to provide 
value-added services superior to basic YouTube analytics, with programmatics and pioneering 
attempts at management of scale and volume. On the latter side, they are managing of a quite 
different class of entry- to mid-level talent, who bring successful audience development and clear 
ideas about the roots of their success with them. The new screen ecology is a space of 
unimagined scale and scope of flourishing online creativity and culture, which is at the same 
time turbulent and precarious for creators and MCNs alike. 
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1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_of_California. 
2 This article is part of a larger program of research into the new screen ecology of social media entertainment, 
mapping the platforms and affordances, content innovation and creative labor, monetization and management, new 
forms of media globalization, and critical cultural concerns raised by this nascent media industry. In 2015, about 100 
interviews with creators, platform executives, MCN executives and managers, talent agents, technology integrators, 
and policy makers have formed part of the program, some of which are drawn on in this section. 
